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Abstract
This paper examines the contribution of job matching to wage growth in the
U.S. and Germany using data drawn from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
and the German Socio-Economic Panel from 1984 through 1992. Using a symmetrical set of variables and data handling procedures, real wage growth is found
to be higher in the U.S. than in Germany during this period. Also, using two different estimators, job matches are found to enhance wage growth in the U.S. and
retard it in Germany. The relationship of general skills to employment in each
country appears responsible for this result.
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National policies for workforce education and training are designed to increase
the human capital of workers and provide a labor pool well suited to the needs of
industry. Increased productivity due to improved skills as well as better matches between
workers and employers should lead to greater individual compensation and increased
national prosperity. This paper provides an empirical examination of the contribution of
job matching to rates of wage growth in two countries that pursue different national
policies for workforce education and training, Germany and the United States1
The choice of these two countries for the analysis allows a contrast between
relatively centralized and decentralized approaches to workforce education and training.
The differences in their respective systems are well known and extensively documented
(Abraham and Houseman 1993). The majority of German workers are educated, trained,
and certified for employment in a specific industry. The number of educational
opportunities are planned, controlled through competitive examination, and financed by
the government. The majority of American workers pursue a general education. Postsecondary education is often self-financed, and demand from students plays a large role
in the opportunities available. Relative to the United States, the German system is both
more centralized and specific in nature.
Which system is preferable from a perspective of either overall wage growth or
improved job matching is debatable. It has been argued that a relatively centralized
system offers a number of advantages. When the average worker leaves school, they do
not face as difficult a transition to work since they are certified for employment. Since
workers have both classroom education and direct experience, they will be more
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productive. As the government actively plans the number of school leavers with specific
certifications, better matches between workers and firms can be achieved.
Each of these possible advantages, however, can be argued to constitute a
potential disadvantage. A system that requires individuals to make occupational
decisions early in life may result in poor choices due to inexperience. At times of
structural shifts in employment or worker dislocation, specific industrial education may
be a disadvantage for worker mobility. Moreover, government planning may lack the
flexibility needed to adapt to changing market conditions.
While there are many possible impacts of a national system of education and
training, this paper specifically examines the impact of job matches on rates of wage
growth in the two countries. Real wage growth is consistently found to be higher in the
United States than in Germany, and using two different estimation techniques, job
matches are found to enhance wage growth in the U.S. while retarding it in Germany.
The paper will proceed with a review of the literature regarding the determinants
of wage growth and the role of job matching in that context. A brief discussion of some
of the institutional differences in the educational and training systems of Germany and
the United States will also be provided. Then, initial evidence will be presented on
overall returns to skills and wage growth in the U.S. and Germany in order to provide a
context for considering the role of job matching. The contribution of job matching to
wage growth will first be considered through an individual fixed effects model. The final
section of the paper will provide an additional analysis of the portion of wage growth
attributable in the two countries to job matching following the approach developed by
Topel (1991).

4
I. Literature Review
Determinants of workers’ wages are fundamental to understanding labor market
activity. An extensive theoretical literature provides competing explanations for
observed patterns in wage rates, and an active empirical literature has confronted those
theories with evidence. The vast majority of this research has focused on individual labor
markets.
A common empirical pattern reported from the earliest research is the presence of
a positive association of both experience and tenure with earnings (Mincer 1962).2 Three
major theories provide explanations for these basic empirical observations; human
capital, job-matching, and efficiency wage.
According to human capital theory, workers are paid according to the value
marginal product of general and specific labor market skills (Becker 1962 and Mincer
1962). General skills are transportable to other employers and specific skills are not.
Since general skills are portable, firms should not pay for their financing. Jobs providing
general skills should have lower starting wages and a positively sloped experienceearnings profile. Specific skills are not transportable and might be financed by the firm
or the individual. If financed by the firm, one would expect the employer to pay enough
to the employee to discourage movement so that the investment can be recouped. If
financed by the employee, a job would be characterized by lower starting pay and a
relatively more steeply sloped wage profile than in the case of firm financing or absence
of training. Intermediate cases of shared investment are also possible (Hashimoto 1981;
Hashimoto 2001; and Leuven and Oosterbeek 2001).
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In matching models, individuals receive job offers during their lifetimes,
successively accepting offers which provide a better fit between them and attributes of
the firm (Burdett 1978; Jovanovic 1979; and Flinn 1986). As both greater experience and
tenure are indicative of the quality of employment matches, both are expected to be
positively related to wages. Thus, these models generate positively sloped wage profiles
which are independent of worker skills.
In efficiency wage models, worker productivity is influenced by pay (Lazear
1981). Young workers are paid less and older workers more than their value marginal
product. This scheme induces young workers to put forth effort in order to stay with a
firm until they can be overpaid as an older worker. For older workers, the incentive is to
work hard in order to continue being paid more than their value. In the model, wages
grow independent of skill
A substantial empirical literature has sought to distinguish which factors from
among these theories best explain patterns observed in returns to years of employment.
Human capital theory indicates that training on the job, whether worker or firm financed,
and whether general or specific, should result in upward sloping wage profiles. To
estimate the relative contributions of general and specific skills in the theory, empirical
researchers have typically focused on years of total work experience as a proxy for time
spent gaining general labor market skills. Similarly, the duration of employment with a
single employer, tenure, is used as a proxy for time potentially spent acquiring specific
labor market skills. From the earliest work (Mincer 1962), the basic empirical pattern of
a positive association of experience and tenure to wages has been universally reported.
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The empirical observation that years of experience and tenure are each positively
related to earnings is consistent with human capital theory but does not rule out other
explanations. Job matching theories also predict upward sloping tenure-wage profiles,
and a body of empirical work has examined the extent to which matching is responsible
for this observation.
The problem encountered in estimation is that observed years of experience and
tenure are related to the quality of a job match. So, estimation methods that do not take
this issue into account provide biased estimates of returns to skills. Some of that
research takes an econometric approach to isolating the effect of job matching relative to
tenure (Flinn 1986; Altonji and Shakotko 1987; and Topel 1991). Based on those
articles, one would reasonably conclude that job matching plays some role in generating
observed returns to skills although estimates of the exact contribution vary.
In order to move away from econometric restrictions in attempts to identify the
effect of matching on returns to tenure, a more recent literature has exploited longitudinal
data from job displacements (Kletzer 1989; Ruhm 1991; and Neal 1995). The argument
behind these papers is that permanent job loss is an exogenous event uncontrolled by
individual workers. Comparing earnings before and after the event of an exogenously
imposed job loss should reveal the extent to which returns to tenure are associated with
factors related to that specific job match. Each of these papers (Kletzer 1989; Ruhm
1991; and Neal 1995) reports evidence that that a portion of returns to skills are due to
the quality of job matches.3
Efficiency wage theories also generate positively sloped wage profiles. One
testable implication of the theory is that these profiles should be more flatly sloped in
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segments of the labor market where agency problems are not as large (Lazear and Moore
1986). Also, since earnings will increase in the absence of productivity gains, returns to
tenure will occur in firms with no training. Levine (1993) finds that firms that provided
more training did not exhibit larger returns to tenure. Other researchers have investigated
whether pay is linked with firm measures of worker productivity such as job evaluations
and have found that the link is weak (Medoff and Abraham 1980 and 1981). Thus, there
is also empirical support for the view that firms use considerations beyond productivity in
their wage setting process.
The most recent research in this area has used information on both firms and their
workers to investigate alternative theories of wage determination in a more integrated
framework (Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis 1999 and Abowd, Kramarz, Margolis, and
Troske 2001). Their research demonstrates that all of the previously theorized influences
do play a role in wage determination. Based on their results, it would also appear that
individual effects are more important than firm effects in explaining the variation in wage
rates.
In summary, these theoretical and empirical literatures have advanced together in
attempting to explain which factors in the labor market lead to positively sloped earnings
profiles. At this point, most would agree that the market rewards general and specific
skills and that observed returns additionally reflect both the quality of the job match as
well as attempts of firms to raise productivity through the structure of compensation.
As our understanding of wage determinants has solidified, a literature which
makes comparisons across countries has begun to develop. The goal of these papers is to
see how similar the factors are which determine wages in different countries and how
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institutions may affect their importance in different societies (Abowd, Kramarz,
Margolis, and Troske 2001, Hashimoto and Raisian 1985 and Levine 1993). Each of
these international comparisons has been limited to some extent in the topics that could
be examined due to the need to have comparable data across countries for the analysis.
The work of Hashimoto and Raisian (1985) was motivated by the superior
economic performance of Japan relative to the United States in the 1970s and 1980s and
the observation that the Japanese labor market appeared to be characterized by longer
attachments between firms and employees. Using nationally representative data, they
found that returns to additional years of employment are higher and peak later in Japan
than in the U.S. From this, they concluded that Japanese workers had a stronger
incentive to remain with one employer, and this was reflected in lower rates of turnover
and higher years of tenure in the Japanese labor market.
Levine (1993) used samples of matched firms and workers in Japan and the
United States to critically examine whether human capital theory was consistent with the
positively sloped employment-earnings profiles in the two countries. Focusing primarily
on whether firms that provide more training have steeper tenure-wage profiles and
whether firms with higher returns to tenure have lower turnover, Levine presented
evidence against both of these hypotheses. He concludes that human capital theory is not
consistent with the evidence presented and suggests that efficiency wage theory provides
a better explanation of wage setting in the two countries.
Abowd, Kramarz, Margolis, and Troske (2001) compare the U.S. and France
using matched individual and firm level data. They examine the impact of firm and
individual characteristics on wage determination and other outcomes. They find that
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standard human capital variables earn positive returns in the labor market and that
unobserved individual and firm attributes impact wages. Another particularly interesting
finding of their study is that higher wages are related to greater productivity in both U.S.
and French firms.
This paper similarly provides a comparative examination of wage rate
determination. The primary focus of the research is to obtain evidence regarding the
contribution of job matching to wage growth in the United States and Germany.
II. Institutional Differences
A detailed examination of all of the institutional differences between Germany
and the United States that impact on this analysis would be out of place in a paper that
seeks to examine an outcome associated with a broad approach rather than a specific
aspect of policy. Nonetheless, some brief information which characterizes the major
differences will be presented here. An excellent, detailed comparison of educational and
labor market institutions in the two countries can be found in Abraham and Houseman
(1993).
German secondary education has two main tracks, vocational training and college
preparatory. Determination of tracking is made by competitive examination. The
majority of German secondary students participate in the vocational track which is
usually referred to as the dual system of education. The term dual refers to classes
students take about the industry in which they will work and the practical training they
simultaneously receive through an apprenticeship at a relevant firm. Upon completion,
the Germans are formally certified to work in an industry. This track of education is
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taken by more than 80 percent of German secondary students (Couch 1994; Winkelmann
1996).
Little formal certification exists for high school students in the United States.
Based on student self-assessments, vocational degrees are received by about 30 percent
of secondary students. At the secondary level, education in the U.S. is clearly more
general in its content than in Germany.
At the post-secondary level, there are other contrasts. University education is
government financed in Germany, and there are few opportunities for those who would
like to self-finance education beyond what their placement scores have merited. 14
percent of Germans hold a university degree. In the United States, ability to pay plays a
much larger role in educational access at the post-secondary level. A policy of loans and
grants has arisen to reduce this concern. Whether through private resources or public
assistance, more opportunities for risk taking exist when individuals perceive postsecondary education is a good investment. As a result, 27 percent of the labor force in
the United States holds a university degree.
While one can make a priori arguments that one or another system is superior, the
German education and job training approach is clearly more centralized than that of the
U.S. Here, the intention is to investigate how these broad policy approaches affect wage
growth and job matches in the two countries.
II. Returns to Skills and Wage Growth in Germany and the United States
Job matching is theoretically expected to be a component of overall wage growth.
In standard models, wage growth can be seen through the combined rates of return to
experience and tenure. To provide initial estimates of returns to skills for Germany and
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the United States, panel regressions of log wages on standard explanatory variables are
estimated using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for the United
States and from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) for Germany for the years
from 1984 through 1992. Male workers ages 18 to 60 are included in the sample.
Additional selection criteria are that the worker must be employed 1000 hours in the year
and must report annual earnings of 1000 Deutsche Marks or the U.S. equivalent. Selfemployed and government workers are excluded. This sample is used as the basis of all
of the analyses presented in the paper. There are 10,110 observations from the PSID and
8,281 from the GSOEP. Unless noted otherwise, estimates presented in the paper are
weighted to account for the longitudinal nature of the data.
For the variables used to decompose the employment experience of a typical
worker into proxies for their general and specific skills, conventions in the literature
regarding their measurement are followed. In both data sets, retrospective information on
years of full-time employment experience is used to calculate years of total labor market
experience. This variable is considered a proxy for general labor market skills. Also,
information regarding years of employment with a specific employer is used to calculate
years of tenure for the workers in each country. This variable is considered a proxy for
specific skills.
In handling each of the variables used in the analysis, identical selection criteria
were used both in extracting the observations and in any recoding which was performed.
Perhaps the one variable which is deserving of some comment is tenure as the noise in
that variable is well known (Topel 1991). One initial comment to make is that relative to
prior studies using the PSID data, the questions asked regarding employment duration
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stopped using bracketed responses and began referring to actual time spans prior to the
date at which the sample here is drawn. While this may have alleviated some problems
regarding noise in the sample, unrealistic patterns in the tenure information were
observed. Thus, some recoding of the data was performed similar to that reported by
Topel. The general effect of this cleaning on the data was to increase the estimated
returns to experience and tenure in both the United States and Germany. None of the
qualitative conclusions were altered. Appendix A1 contains a description of the
recoding, patterns of tenure in the two countries, and a comparison of the tenure variable
from the PSID against a published source.
Other regressors included in the analysis are marital status, years of schooling,
and a set of categorical time dummies. The dependent variable is the natural log of
average hourly wages calculated as annual labor earnings divided by annual work hours.
The wages are measured as real 1984 figures. Unweighted means and standard
deviations of the pooled sample of observations from each country are reported in table 1.
Comparable weighted estimates are contained in appendix table 2.4
The equation estimated can be written as:
Yijt = α + β 1 X ijt + β 2Tijt + ε ijt (1.)

Y refers to the log of average hourly wages. The subscript i refers to individuals, j to
employers, and t to time periods.. X represents years of full-time job experience. T
represents years of tenure with an employer. ε is measurement error.
In addition to the means and standard deviations of the variables, table 1 contains
unweighted parameter estimates from the panel regressions for Germany and the United
States. The terms for experience and tenure are represented as quartics. Based on those
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estimates, in the U.S., the estimated return to a year of experience is 6.3 percent and for
an additional year of employment tenure is 4.4 percent. This yields a combined 10.7
percent average rate of wage growth over the period examined. For Germany, the
returns to both experience and tenure are much lower than in the United States. Returns
to years of experience are 3.1 percent and 1.3 percent for a year of tenure yielding a
combined 4.4 percent annual increase in wages. By reference to the estimates contained
in appendix table 2, it can be seen that weighting has a relatively small impact on the
parameter estimates.
In general, the returns to both experience and tenure in Germany and the United
States have the expected shape. This can be seen by the alternating signs of the
parameter estimates associated with the higher order terms for tenure and experience in
each country. All of the relevant parameter estimates are statistically significant at the
.05 level.
IV. Fixed Effect Estimates
In matching theory, individuals search for jobs where their own characteristics
align with the needs of an employer. Good outcomes are more durable, and years of
observed experience and tenure reflect the quality of a job match. One method of
investigating the contribution of job matches to wage growth is to model that component
as an individual fixed effect.
The fixed effect estimation equation rewrites the error term to consist of a time
invariant component related to individuals along with a fixed component for each time
period. The equation for individuals can be written as:
Yijt = α + β1 X ijt + β 2Tijt + φi + γ t + ζ ijt
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Φi represents the individual fixed effect. γt represents the fixed time component. ξ is the
random error component.
Table 1 contains unweighted results for the fixed effect models estimated for the
U.S. and Germany. Because the panel regressions contained in table 1 included dummy
variables for the years from which the data were drawn and a common set of control
variables, the impact of the individual fixed effects can be seen by the change in the
parameter estimates across the two tables. Interestingly, as individual fixed effects are
controlled for in the United States, the estimates of both the returns to experience and
tenure fall. One interpretation of this result is that gross returns to labor market skills are
inflated by the average quality of employment matches. In Germany, the opposite result
is found. Relative to the panel regression estimates in table 1, the returns to experience
and tenure rise when the individual fixed effects are included. One interpretation is the
average quality of job matches depresses observed wage growth.
V. Residual Correlation Model
Examining the possibility that the quality of job matches are reflected in
individual fixed effects tells us something about the portion of wage growth that might be
attributed to job matching. An alternative method of modeling the relationship between
observed labor market activity and the unobserved quality of a job match was developed
by Topel (1991). The method provides estimates of total wage growth as well as the
component attributable to job matching. The model of Topel (1991) begins with a
standard log wage equation (1.) in the form of the one presented earlier in the paper.5

15
Potential biases exist in obtaining estimates of the returns to general and specific
skills from least squares estimates of equation (1.) since either may be correlated with the
error term, εijt. This can be made more explicit by rewriting the residual as

ε ijt = φijt + µ i + υ ijt
µi represents an individual fixed effect. φ ijt represents factors specific to the match
between a job and individual. νijt is random error. The factors specific to a job match
may be nonorthogonal to tenure and experience. Represent this relationship as

φijt = X ijt b1 + Tijt b2 + η ijt
This system of equations together yields the conclusion that least square estimates of β1
and β2 will be consistent but biased; i.e.,
E ( βˆ1 ) = β 1 + b1
and
.

E ( βˆ 2 ) = β 2 + b2

From (1.), a two-step estimation procedure is formed by first estimating a differenced
earnings equation. This eliminates fixed job and individual effects. The equation to be
estimated is
Yijt − Yijt −1 = β 1 + β 2 + ε ijt − ε ijt −1 (2.)
Least squares of (2.) will provide an estimate of total wage growth.
The second stage of the estimation procedure removes the portion of growth due
to years of tenure from observed earnings then estimates the returns to experience at the
time the job started.
Yijt − Tijt βˆ = X 0 β1 + ε ijt (3.)
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Here, βˆ represents the estimates of parameters associated with wage growth from the
first step. X0 represents experience at the time the current job started. By this procedure,
an estimate of the returns to seniority is obtained as βˆ 2 = ( βˆ1 + βˆ 2 ) − βˆ1 . When least
squares is applied to this system of equations, the resulting estimates are consistent but
biased.
E ( βˆ1 ) = β1 + b1 + γ X 0T (b1 + b2 ) (4a.)
and
E ( βˆ 2 ) = β 2 − b1 + γ X 0T (b1 + b2 ) (4b.)

Although these estimates are biased, they provide an upper bound on the
estimated return to general skills and a lower bound on the return to specific skills. γ X 0T
is the coefficient from an auxiliary regression of tenure on initial experience. An
empirical estimate of (b1 + b2) can be obtained by reinserting Tijt into the right hand side
of equation (3.) since φijt can be rewritten as X 0 b1 + Tijt (b1 + b2 ) + η ijt . Thus, one can
also obtain an inference about a portion of the bias in equation (4.), γ X 0T (b1 + b2 ) .
Table 2 shows the results of the estimation of equation (2.) by least squares. The
change in experience variable is omitted because it would be collinear with the change in
tenure variable. The parameter associated with ∆Tenure thus estimates β1 + β2 ; i.e., the
overall rate of wage growth. Across the three columns of the table, various combinations
of higher order terms are presented to demonstrate the relative stability of the parameter
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estimate associated with ∆Tenure. Across all of the estimates, the higher order terms
take the expected signs. Statistical significance at the .05 level is denoted in the table.
Comparing the results shown here for the United States to those obtained by
Topel (table 2, p. 157) using PSID data spanning the period from 1968 through 1983,
they are very similar. For example, in the quartic specification in column (3.), the
estimated magnitude of β1 + β2 in Topel’s work is .126 which is the same as the value
reported here in table 3. While this result is certainly not expected, it does suggest that
wage growth has not changed appreciably across these two time periods.
The estimates for wage growth in Germany based on equation (2.) which are
shown in table 2 indicate that the combined returns to a year of experience and
employment tenure are smaller than in the United States. Table 3 provides the second
step estimates from equation (3.) of the experience parameter, β1. By subtracting β1
from β1 + β2, an estimate is obtained for β2. In order to provide standard errors for β1
and β2 that are reflective of the two stage estimation procedure, the calculation process
was bootstrapped for 100 iterations, sampling the individuals in the sample with
replacement. The standard errors shown in table 3 result from the bootstrapping
procedure. Statistical significance at the .05 level is denoted in the table.
The parameter estimates for the U.S. are very similar to those reported by Topel
(table 3, p.158).

He reports the return to experience to be .071 and .055 for the return to

tenure. Here, the return to experience is .085 and the return to tenure is .041. The return
to experience, .034, is smaller in Germany than for the U.S. The estimated return to
tenure in Germany, .064, is larger than in the U.S.
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The estimate of the bias term, (b1 + b2), is obtained by inserting the tenure
variable on the right hand side of equation (3.) and applying least squares. The estimates
are shown in the last column and reflect the impact job matching would be expected to
have on least squares estimates. The standard errors reported in the table are also
bootstrapped to reflect the two stage estimation procedure. The estimate is positive for
the U.S. and negative for Germany. The interpretation is that unobservables related to
job match quality would lead to an overstatement of skill related wage growth in the
United States and an understatement in Germany using least squares. Stated differently,
average job match quality has led to an increased rate of wage growth in the U.S. but has
reduced it in Germany.
The signs of these job match components are consistent with the estimates
obtained using the fixed-effects estimator. Prior research suggests that the negative sign
from each of these estimators for Germany is plausible. For example, Abowd, Karmarz,
and Margolis (Table IV) also report impacts of firm matching on returns to tenure in
France which range from 0 to -.036 depending on the estimator employed. They also
demonstrate that controlling for person fixed effects raises the estimated return to
experience in France. In general, this is the same pattern found here for Germany.6
The estimate of bias in total wage growth provided by (b1 + b2) can also be
inserted into equation (4.) to gauge a portion of the bias that unobservables have on either
the estimated return to experience or tenure. This requires that an additional parameter,

γ X T , be estimated from an auxiliary regression of tenure on initial experience. That
o

parameter for the U.S. is -.064 and -.160 for Germany. Calculated as γ X 0T (b1 + b2 ) , the
portion of the bias due to this component in each country is negligible, -.002 in the U.S.
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and .004 in Germany. Considering equation (4.), the implication is that in both countries
the bias in estimating rates of return operates principally through the correlation of
general skills with job matches.
VI. Conclusion
This paper provides an analysis of the contribution of job matching to wage
growth in Germany and the United States. The estimated rate of real wage growth in the
U.S. is consistently found to be higher than in Germany. This result is obtained both in
panel regressions (table 1) and in a differenced estimator (table 2).
Real rates of wage growth, however, depend on many policies beyond those
directly aimed at the labor market. While job matches also depend on factors beyond a
nation’s approach to workforce education and training, those policies are directly
intended to provide better employment matches between workers and firms. Moreover,
accepted theory suggests that one component of wage growth is due to job matching.
In the analysis presented here, job matches are found to promote overall wage
growth in the U.S. In Germany, job matches are found to retard overall wage growth.
This result is consistent across both a fixed effect estimator (table 1) and a two step
procedure (tables 2 and 3) developed by Topel (1991). Also, using the two-step
estimator, evidence is found in both countries that the impact of job matching on wage
growth operates primarily through the relationship of general skills to employment.
Education and training policies have many other aims beyond promoting wage
growth or improvement of employment matches. Also, empirical results such as these
are appropriately seen as robust when replicated in other research. Nonetheless, the
results reported here for the effect of job matching on wage growth are potentially very
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interesting because they suggest that some of the common complaints about relatively
centralized and specific systems of education and training may be true.
Having youths choose occupations relatively early may result in poor individual
choices that are difficult to correct. Focusing on specific skills may reduce chances for
mobility. Planning may not be flexible enough in the face of structural changes in the
economy. The research contained in this paper does not address each of these individual
topics but does suggest avenues for future research.
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Table 1
Unweighted Estimates of Returns to Skills in the United States and Germany
1984-1992
Means and
Standard Deviations
United Germany
States

Panel Regressions

Fixed Effect Model

United
States

Germany

United
States

Germany

12.05
(8.17)
2.12
(2.66)
4.65
(8.13)
11.58
(25.08)

18.72
(11.42)
4.81
(4.63)
14.11
(17.62)
44.59
(67.25)

.063
(.005)*
-.561
(.063)*
.214
(.029)*
-.028
(.004)*

.031
(.002)*
-.218
(.022)*
.063
(.008)*
-.006
(.001)*

.044
(.007)*
-.383
(.081)*
.132
(.037)*
-.016
(.006)*

.041
(.003)*
-.199
(.028)*
.056
(.010)*
-.006
(.001)*

9.04
(8.41)
1.52
(2.58)
3.44
(8.17)
8.99
(27.46)

10.80
(8.67)
1.92
(2.62)
4.21
(8.19)
10.54
(27.16)

.044
(.004)*
-.255
(.049)*
.068
(.021)*
-.007
(.003)*

.013
(.002)*
-.094
(.023)*
.034
(.010)*
-.004
(.001)*

.018
(.004)*
-.136
(.049)*
.044
(.022)*
-.005
(.003)*

.017
(.002)*
-.164
(.026)*
.055
(.012)*
-.006
(.002)*

Years of School

13.23
(2.35)

11.45
(2.58)

.052
(.001)*

.019
(.001)*

.002
(.009)

.037
(.005)*

Marital Status

.75
(.44)

.74
(.44)

.059
(.006)*

.031
(.004)*

.011
(.008)*

.014
(.006)*

Log Wages

.93 (.28)

1.11 (.15)

-----

-----

-----

-----

R-Squared
N

----10,110

----8,281

.33
10,110

.27
8,281

.15
10,110

.16
8,281

Regressors:
Experience
Experience2/(102)
Experience3/(103)
Experience4/(104)
Tenure
Tenure2/(102)
Tenure3/(103)
Tenure4/(104)

Source: The estimates presented in the table are weighted and based on calculations by the author using
data drawn from the 1984 through 1992 years of the PSID and GSOEP. A full description of the sample is
contained in the text. The estimates are weighted to reflect the longitudinal nature of the data. Entries in
the columns for mean and standard deviation take the form: mean (standard deviation). Entries in the other
columns take the form: parameter (standard error). See Appendix table 2 for unweighted estimates. *
denotes statistical significance at the .05 level.
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Table 2
Estimates of Equation (2.)
Model of Annual Within-Job Wage Growth
PSID and GSOEP Males 1984-1992
Dependent Variable is Change in Log Real Wage
United States
Variable
Tenure

(1.)

(2.)

(3.)

.117 (.016)*

.118 (.016)*

.126 (.018)*

-.069 (.022)*

-.306 (.148)*

Tenure2 /(102)
Tenure3 /(103)

.068 (.064)

Tenure4 /(104)

-.004 (.008)

Experience2 /(102)

-.735 (.168)*

-.673 (.169)*

-.540 (.175)*

Experience3 /(103)

.193 (.065)*

.187 (.065)

.141 (.067)*

Experience4 /(104)

-.018 (.008)*

-.018 (.008)

-.013 (.008)

.012

.014

.016

R-Squared

Germany
Tenure

.079 (.014)

*

Tenure2 /(102)

.081 (.014)*

.098 (.015)*

-.034 (.022)

-.523 (.129)*

Tenure3 /(103)

.228 (.057)*

Tenure4 /(104)

-.031 (.008)*

Experience2 /(102)

-.291 (.137)*

-.279 (.137)*

-.149 (.142)

Experience3 /(103)

.080 (.048)

.081 (.048)

.038 (.049)

Experience4 /(104)

-.008 (.005)

-.009 (.005)

-.004 (.006)

.010

.010

.010

R-Squared

Note: Table entries take the form: parameter (standard error). The estimates are
weighted. * denotes statistical significance at the .05 level.
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Table 3
Second Step Estimates
Effects of Experience ( 1) and Tenure ( 2) on Log Real Wages
and Least-Squares Bias in Wage Growth (b1 + b2)

United States

Wage Growth Experience
β1 + β2
β1
.126 (.009)*
.085 (.010)*

Tenure
β2
.041 (.009)*

Growth Bias
b1 + b2
0.032 (.007)*

Germany

.098 (.009)*

.064 (.004)*

-0.022 (.006)*

.034 (.009)*

Note: Table entries for model estimates take the form: parameter (standard error). Other
variables included in the model estimates are years of education and marital status. *
denotes statistical significance at the .05 level.
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Appendix A
Employment Tenure in the U.S. and Germany
Direct data regarding years of employment tenure are relatively rare and form a
key variable for the analysis presented in this paper. Beyond a description of the
recoding of the tenure information, this appendix contains a table of basic patterns of
employment tenure across Germany and the U.S. and a comparison of the U.S. figures to
published data.
The specific cleaning done to the tenure variable in both countries was to examine
cases where across years of continuous employment, the tenure variable made
discontinuous jumps. The illogical jumps were recoded to be consistent with adjoining
observations. Also, where years of experience or tenure were simply infeasible given the
age of the individual, they were dropped from the sample.
Appendix table 1 contains information regarding years of employment tenure for
various age groupings in Germany and the United States. The figures reported in the
table are calculated using the samples from the PSID and GSOEP for male workers
described in the body of the paper.
Among male workers ages 18 to 60, median employment tenure in Germany is
seven years versus four for the United States. Tenure is low in both countries in the early
stages of labor market activity as would be expected. By mid-life, German workers
remain longer with their employers. Among male workers ages 35-44, median tenure in
Germany is ten years as opposed to seven in the U.S. In later years of working activity in
the United States, median tenure declines. As a result, in the oldest age range examined,
median tenure is 16 years in Germany versus 8 in the U.S. The attachment of workers to
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employers is more durable in Germany than in the United States, particularly as workers
become older.
A brief examination of the tails of the distribution of years of tenure supports this
conclusion. Among all male workers in the United States, 70 percent have less than 10
years of tenure and 19 percent have more than 15 years. In Germany, 58 percent have
less than 10 years of tenure while 27 percent have more than 15 years. In Germany
relative to the United States, fewer workers have short durations with their employer and
more have longer durations. This pattern is driven by older workers in Germany being
characterized by having longer durations of employment than are observed in the United
States.
It would be helpful to know if the numbers calculated here agree with other
sources of information. While a comparative source of data is not available for Germany,
the numbers shown in table A1 for the United States accord well with official statistics.
For example, the Statistical Abstract of the United States reports that in 1998, median
years of tenure for workers ages 16 and over is 3.7 years and is 4.0 years for workers ages
20 and over. Here, years of tenure for a sample ages 18 to 60 are calculated to be 4.0
years. Perhaps of greater concern for the United States data is the rising pattern for years
of tenure that declines at later ages. In the Statistical Abstract, the same pattern is
observed. Although the numbers calculated here are from panel data and the official
statistics are based on cross-sectional data with a larger sample, the figures are
nonetheless close in their levels and exhibit similar patterns in the movement of years of
tenure with age.

29

Appendix Table 1
Distribution of Male Population by Age and Tenure
1984-1992
United States

Germany

Age

Median
Tenure

Less Than
10 Years

More Than
15 Years

Median
Tenure

Less Than
10 Years

More Than
15 Years

18-19

1.0

100.0

0.0

0.0

100.0

0.0

20-24

2.0

100.0

0.0

1.0

100.0

0.0

25-34

3.0

86.0

3.0

4.0

84.0

3.0

35-44

7.0

59.0

25.0

10.0

48.0

28.0

45-49

11.0

48.0

41.0

14.0

33.0

48.0

50-60

8.0

53.0

39.0

16.0

34.0

53.0

All Ages

4.0

70.0

19.0

7.0

58.0

27.0

Source: The numbers reported in the table were calculated by the author using data from
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics for the United States and the German SocioEconomic Panel for Germany. Data from both surveys were drawn from the panel years
from 1984 through 1992 and are weighted to account for their longitudinal nature. Other
than the median tenure figures reported, the other table entries are percentages.
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Appendix Table 2
Weighted Regressions of Male Wages for Germany and the United States
1984-1992
Means and Standard Deviations
United States

Regressions

Germany

United States

Germany

Regressors:

Experience

11.44 (8.10)

19.21 (11.42)

.069 (.005)*

.029 (.002)*

Experience2/(102)

1.96 (2.59)

4.99 (4.67)

-.601 (.057)*

-.205 (.022)*

Experience3/(103)

4.26 (7.86)

14.73 (17.88)

.220 (.026)*

.059 (.008)*

Experience4/(104)

10.57 (24.11)

46.74 (68.53)

-.028 (.004)*

-.006 (.001)*

Tenure

8.59 (8.12)

11.04 (8.73)

.038 (.004)*

.013 (.002)*

Tenure2/(102)

1.40 (2.44)

1.98 (2.66)

-.216 (.044)*

-.105 (.023)*

Tenure3/(103)

3.08 (7.68)

4.38 (8.39)

.058 (.018)*

.039 (.010)*

Tenure4/(104)

7.93 (25.72)

11.02 (27.9)

-.006 (.003)*

-.005 (.001)*

Years of School

12.76 (2.44)

11.46 (2.52)

.048 (.001)*

.018 (.001)*

Marital Status

.71 (.45)

.75 (.43)

.046 (.006)*

.030 (.004)*

Log Wages

.87 (.31)

1.10 (.154)

---------------

---------------

.34

.26

10,110

8,281

R-Squared
N

--------------10,110

--------------8,281

Source: The estimates presented in the table are based on calculations by the author using data drawn from
the 1984 through 1992 years of the PSID and GSOEP. A full description of the sample is contained in the
text. The estimates are weighted to reflect the longitudinal nature of the data. Entries in the columns for
mean and standard deviation take the form: mean(standard deviation). Entries in the columns for the

regressions take the form: parameter(standard error).
the .05 level.

*

denotes statistical significance at
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Endnotes
1

The data used in the analysis span the years 1984-1992. In order to avoid problems associated with
reunification, only the former West Germany is considered in the analysis.
2
Earnings in this literature often refers to a periodic rate of pay. For the remainder of the paper, the terms
earnings and wages will be used interchangeably although the paper analytically considers wages.
3
The literature on displacement in Germany is more recent and has yet to consider this topic (Burda and
Mertens 2001; Couch 2001; and Pfann and Hamermesh 2001).
4
All of the figures presented in table 1 are unweighted. The estimator for the fixed effect model would not
accept weights so a decision was made to have all calculations in the table remain unweighted to facilitate
a comparison to the panel regression estimates. Weighted values for the means and the panel regressions
are found in appendix table 2. By comparison, the reader can see that the weighting had relatively impact
on the calculations.
5
The notation follows that of Topel. More detail may be found in his paper.
6

The only dissimilarity in the finding reported in table 3 relative to those of Topel (1991) and others who
have used this estimation technique (Jacobsen and Levin, 2002) is the magnitude of the estimated job
matching bias. Discussions with Jacobsen and detailed examinations of the estimation programs have not
uncovered a source of this difference.

